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I. THE ACTUAL LE'ITER 1 2
~uprenre <llourt of tqe ;llinite~ ~httes

;1lllb:sqingfon, gi.<ll. 20543

Chambers of
THE CHIEF JUSTICE

April 22, 1993

Dear Mr. Speaker:
By direction of the Supreme Court of the United States, I have the
honor to submit to the Congress amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that have been adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 2072 of Title 28, United States Code. While the Court is satisfied that
the required procedures have been observed, this transmittal does not
necessarily indicate that the Court itself would have proposed these
amendments in the form submitted.
Justice White has issued a separate statement. Justice Scalia has issued
a dissenting statement, which Justice Thomas joins and Justice Souter
joins in part.
Accompanying these rules are excerpts from the report of the Judicial
Conference of the United States containing the Advisory Committee Notes
submitted to the Court for its consideration pursuant to Section 331 of
Title 28, United States Code.

I. Editor's Note: THE AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS
were originally published in a House Document at H.R. Doc. No. 74, 103d Cong., !st Sess. 98
(1993). The House Document appears in its entirety at AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, 146 F.R.D. 401. The Florida Law Re1•iew has elected to cite to Federal Rules Decisions
for the sake of efficiency. The reprinted in form is used throughout the symposium issue to refer to
the original publication of the material in House Document form, however. the citation to H.R. Doc.
No. 74 will appear only in the initial citation to the amendments in each article. Thereafter, the cita·
tion will be to AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 146 F.R.D. 401. As a final
note, portions of the material are also in the Interim Edition of the I 14th volume of the Supreme Court
Reporter.
2. Letter from William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, to
Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Apr. 22, 1993), in H.R. Doc. No. 74,
103d Cong., !st Sess. 98 (1993), reprinted in AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, 146 F.R.D. 401, 403 (1993) [hereinafter AMENDMENTS]. This is the letter in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist transmitted to Congress amendments to various Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which became effective on December I, 1993. Id. at 401 (giving notice that the amendments to the
Federal Rules, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, became effective December I, 1993).
Congress did not act; however, I wrote the translation of the letter below immediately after the Court
transmitted the package of amendments and before Congress completed consideration of it. The Su·
preme Court is empowered to develop rules of procedure for the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Sincerely,
William H. Rehnquist
Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
II. THE TRANSLATION3

A. Introduction
The Chief Justice transmits to Congress the following amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in accordance with Section 2074 of
Title 28 of the United States Code.4 These revisions constitute the most
ambitious package of amendments to the Federal Rules in their half-century history. The three-year revision process under which the Supreme Court
adopted these amendments is the first important test of new revision procedures that Congress instituted in 1988 to increase public scrutiny of and
to improve the revision process.5
The Court emphasizes the changes in Rule 11 governing sanctions and
the amendment of Rule 26 covering discovery, the latter concentrating on
mandatory or automatic prediscovery disclosure. The Court focuses on
revised Rule 11 because its 1983 amendment has proven to be the most
controversial revision of the civil rules ever promulgated.6 The Court
focuses on revised Rule 26 because numerous complications that attend
discovery seriously threaten the civil justice system.7 Moreover, the

3. This is my translation of what the letter did not say, but what I interpret to have actually
happened in the rule revision process.
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
5. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 2071-2074,
2077, 102 Stat. 4642, 4648-50 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074, 2077 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)). See generally Harold S. Lewis, The Excessive History of Federal Rule IS(c) and Its
Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1507 (1987) (providing background on the Federal
Rules revision process); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery
and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795 (1991) (same and predicting increased
politicization of the Federal Rules revision process as a result of increased public participation).
6. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 11 IOWA
L. REV. 1775, 1775 (1992); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking,
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 455-59 (1993).
7. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON DISCOVERY, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION ON
COMMERCIAL AND FEDERAL LmGATION, REPORT ON DISCOVERY UNDER RULE 26(b)(l), reprinted in
127 F.R.D. 625 (1990); Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Litigation: Enough Is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REY. 579, 586-87; Ralph K. Winter, Jn Defense of Discovery
Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REY. 263, 263-64 (1992).
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amendment prescribing automatic disclosure may prove to be the most
controversial formal proposal to modify the Federal Rules in their history. 8 In short, because sanctions and discovery are critical to federal civil
litigation, analysis of the Rule 11 and Rule 26 revisions and of the rule
amendment process affords instructive insights on modern civil procedure.
B. Specific Amendments
1. Amended Rule 11
The Rule 11 revision process was replete with ironies.9 The Advisory
Committee on the Civil Rules (Advisory Committee) issued a preliminary
draft proposal to amend Rule 11 only eight years after Rule 11 's significant revision. 10 This time frame constituted a substantially shorter period
for testing an amendment's efficacy than the one generation time frame
prescribed by knowledgeable experts including Judge Benjamin Kaplan
and Professor Arthur Miller, two former Advisory Committee Reporters. 11 Unfortunately, the preliminary draft failed to address many of the
complications that plagued the 1983 alteration of Rule 11.
The Advisory Committee based its decision to propose revision partly
on the perception that the 1983 provision was "unduly discouraging vigorous advocacy on behalf of particular parties, especially civil rights plaintiffs."12 The reality may have been that Rule 11 was disadvantaging civil

8. See Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts. 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1589, 1611-12 (1994) [hereinafter Tobias, lmproi·ing]; Carl Tobias. Rule II and Civil Rights
Litigation. 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485. 485-86 & n.2 (1988/89) (asserting 1983 Rule 11 amendment was
most controversial revision ever adopted) [hereinafter Tobias, Rule 1l]; supra note 6 and accompanying text (same).
9. Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855, 864-905 (1992) [hereinafter
Tobias, Reconsidering]; Carl Tobias, Rule Revision Roundelay. 1992 WIS. L. REV. 236, 236-38 [hereinafter Tobias. Roundelay).
10. COMMITfEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (1991). reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53 (1991)
[hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT).
11. See Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary Obsen•ations Concerning Civil Rule 23. 43 F.R.D.
39, 52 (1967) (citing Kaplan's view of a one generation time period for evaluating the Federal Rules);
Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action
Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 677 (1979) (providing Miller's similar view); Arthur R. Miller, The
New Certification Standard Under Rule II. 130 F.R.D. 479, 505-06 (1990) (observing that the Rules
were revised without allowing for sufficient time to measure their adequacy).
12. Tobias, Roundelay, supra note 9. at 326; see also PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note IO. at 64.
79 (stating that one purpose of rule change is to "equalize the burdens" between plaintiffs and defendants); Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9. at 862 (observing that members of the public criticized
the 1983 version of Rule 11 as having a chilling effect upon civil rights litigation); Georgene M.
Vairo. Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going. 60 FORD. L. REV. 475, 484-85 (1991) (arguing that defendants in civil rights actions often use Rule 11 to attack civil rights plaintiffs unfairly).
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rights plaintiffs less than numerous such plaintiffs and their counsel had
argued, according to a 1991 Federal Judicial Center (FJC) Rule 11 study
commissioned by the Advisory Committee. 13 Thus, while the Advisory
Committee admirably commissioned the study, the Committee appeared to
rely rather selectively on its findings. Such selective reliance might have
been appropriate because Rule 11 has been studied extensively, producing
a veritable "cottage industry" of seven major assessments and hundreds of
law review articles, some of which have yielded controversial or conflicting conclusions. 14
In the final analysis, however, the Advisory Committee's decision to
premise proposed amendment of Rule 11 on the perception that the rule
unduly discouraged zealous representation of civil rights plaintiffs and
other litigants may actually have been correct. 15 The most comprehensive
Rule 11 study, conducted under the auspices of the American Judicature
Society, showed that judges have sanctioned civil rights plaintiffs as frequently as any other category of federal court litigants. 16 Furthermore, the
study asserted that the 1983 version of Rule 11 prompted civil rights
lawyers to advise clients to abandon potentially legitimate cases. 17
In an important component of the 1991 FJC study, the FJC circulated
a questionnaire to every federal district judge. 18 Although four-fifths of
the judges who responded thought that the 1983 revision of Rule 11
should be retained, 19 a like percentage believed that groundless litigation,
the reduction of which was a major reason for the 1983 amendment, posed
minor difficulty. 20 The trial bench was also evenly divided over whether
·groundless lawsuits had increased since 1983.21 Moreover, a majority of

But see Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 864-65 (citing studies which stated that Rule 11 "was
not as problematic as many civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys had contended").
13. See ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CI'R., The Federal Judicial Center's
Study of Rule 11, in FJC DIRECTIONS 3, 3-4 (1991); Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 864-65.
14. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transfonnation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of
Rule I I, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1930 (1989) (producing a cottage industry of studies yielding controversial or conflicting conclusions); Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bath Water: The Prospects
for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 796 (1993) (same). See generally Vairo, supra note
12, at 476, 478-82 (documenting studies and articles and discussing the Rule 11 "cottage industry").
15. See Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule II, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 943,
966-73 (1992). See generally Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances K. Zemans, Local Legal Culture and
Control of Litigation, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 535, 536-37, 539-49 (1993) (discussing Advisory
Committee's rationale for amendment and studying the effects of Rule 11 on "local legal culture").
16. See Marshall et al., supra note 15, at 966-73.
17. See id. at 971.
18. Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 863.
19. ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CI'R., Judicial Assessment of Rule 11: ]ts
Effectiveness and Its Impact on Litigation in Federal Coun, in FJC DIRECTIONS, supra note 13, at 3335.
20. See id. at 29-30.
21. Id. at 29.
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the judges found that prompt resolution of motions to dismiss and motions
for summary judgment as well as use of pretrial conferences, Rule 26 and
Rule 37 sanctions, and informal warnings were more effective in disposing
of groundless cases than Rule 11.22
Another irony of the recent Rule 11 amendment was that the Advisory
Committee's work on the preliminary draft proposal to revise Rule 11
apparently pleased few of the interested constituencies which the proposal
would have affected. 23 For instance, the imposition of a continuing duty
to withdraw tiny portions of papers when they cease being meritorious and
the prospect of having to pay substantial financial sanctions for violating
the rule troubled resource-poor litigants. 24 The defense bar was bothered
by specific inclusion of denials as components of papers that must satisfy
Rule 11 and by the decreased likelihood of recovering attorneys' fees for
Rule 11 violations. 25 Latent ambiguities in the draft's language relating,
for instance, to the calculation of proper sanctions and attorneys' fees concerned numerous lawyers and parties who participate in federal civil litigation.26 The Advisory Committee thoroughly studied the 1983 amendment,
solicited and seriously considered public input before proposing an amendment,27 and carefully prepared a draft which it believed would be acceptable to all affected interests. 28
The Advisory Committee's preliminary draft of the Rule 11 revision
was published together with a counter-proposal written by judges and
other distinguished members of the American legal community in the
same Federal Rules Decisions advance sheets. 29 This counter-proposal to
the Advisory Committee's draft suggested, for example, the deletion of
any continuing duty to amend pleadings and the proscription of attorney

22. Id. at 29-30; see also Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933, 958-59 (1991) (discussing Rule 26 and Rule 37 sanctions).
23. See generally Tobias, Rule 11, supra note 8, at 498-501 (discussing the hardship created by a
party's limited financial resources in civil rights cases); Vairo, supra note 12, at 483-85 (discussing the
chilling effect and satellite litigation problems inherent in Rule 11 ).
24. See Tobias, Roundelay, supra note 9, at 237.
25. See id. See generally Vairo, supra note 12, at 495-500 (criticizing the Advisory Committee's
major revisions to Rule 11 ).
26. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 894-95; Tobias, Roundelay, supra note 9, at 238.
27. COMMITTEE ON RULES AND PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, CALL FOR WRITTEN COMMENTS ON RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND RELATED RULES (1990), reprimed in 131 F.R.D. 335, 345 (1990) (hereinafter CALL
FOR COMMENTS); Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 861-65.
28. See, e.g., Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 893-905; Vairo, supra note 12, at 495-500.
29. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 10, at 75; A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM ET AL., BENCH-BAR
PROPOSAL TO REVISE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 11, reprimed in 137 F.R.D. 159, 159 (1991). The counter-proposal was formulated by a group of distinguished members of the legal community, including
Judges Leon and Patrick Higginbotham, former Advisory Committee member John Frank, and former
president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America Bill Wagner. Id.
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fee awards as sanctions.Jo The plaintiffs public interest and civil rights
bars found this counter-proposal considerably more palatable.J 1
The Advisory Committee developed additional iterations of the preliminary draft, so that the final document submitted by the Committee during
May 1992 to the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Evidence
and Procedure (Standing Committee) ironically resembled the counterproposal in several respects.J2 Although the counter-proposal may have
influenced the Advisory Committee, and members of the group sponsoring
it might claim such credit, the Advisory Committee would probably have
reached the same result without the group's prompting and without the
group making certain Committee members feel unduly pressured.JJ ,
The changes in the preliminary draft were apparently attributable to
the Advisory Committee's conscientious efforts to solicit and review considerable written public comment,34 to hear testimony at three public
hearings,J5 and to rethink and rewrite numerous aspects of the preliminary draft.J 6 These endeavors enabled the Advisory Committee to craft
the fairest, clearest, most efficacious revision possible.J7 Indeed, the Advisory Committee's work in assembling the final proposal to amend Rule
11 closely approximates the type of reasoned decisionmaking and open,
responsive rule revision process that Congress envisioned when it recently
modified the rule amendment procedures.J8
Notwithstanding the Advisory Committee's prodigious efforts and the
significant improvements in the proposed revision of Rule 11, some observers continued to oppose the changes recommended.J9 Justice Antonin
Scalia, who pens an acerbic dissent to the Court's transmittal of amended

30. HIGGINBOTIIAM ET AL., supra note 29, at 165-70.
31. The assertion regarding palatability is premised on my personal conversations with numerous
members of these bars.
32. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 72 (asserting that the
Advisory Committee omitted several of the Rule 11 requirements from the Preliminary Draft). Compare EXCERPT FROM THE REPoRT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITl'EE ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE SEPI'EMBER 1992, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 577-83, 585-86 (limiting the duty to correct papers that include unsupported factual allegations) with HIGGINBOTIIAM ET
AL., supra note 29, at 165-66 (suggesting that the continuing duty to withdraw non-meritorious claims
in court documents be circumscribed).
33. This is premised on my assessment of the Advisory Committee's work and on my personal
conversations with several individuals who are knowledgeable about the Committee's work. See generally Tobias, supra note 6, at 1789-93 (analyzing the Standing Committee's draft).
34. See Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 10 IND. LJ. 171, 176-85 (1994).
35. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 859-65.
36. See supra note 32 and accompanying texL
37. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. See generally Walker, supra note 6, at 457 (suggesting reforms for improving federal civil rule revision).
39. See Tobias, supra note 34, at 186-87.

134

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

Rule 11,40 is perhaps the amendment's most prominent critic. 41 He contends that adoption of the Rule 11 revision would "eliminate a significant
and necessary deterrent to frivolous litigation."42 Justice Scalia argues
that the amendment will make Rule 11 "toothless," because it accords
judges discretion to levy sanctions, disfavors compensation for litigation
costs, and provides safe harbors which would enable parties who contravene Rule 11 to avoid sanctions altogether. 43
Justice Scalia claims that safe harbors are overly solicitous of attorneys and litigants who abuse the litigation process, permitting them to
"file thoughtless, reckless, and harassing pleadings, secure in the knowledge that they have nothing to lose" because they can withdraw the offending papers upon notification. 44 He criticizes the proposal for entrusting sanctions to judicial discretion, remarking that courts will not punish
offenders unless required to do so.45 Moreover, Justice Scalia warns that
restrictions on sanctioning for compensatory purposes will reduce "the
likelihood that frivolousness will even be challenged" by decreasing the
incentives of those who can best alert judges to perversion of the litigation
process.46
Despite his criticisms, Justice Scalia states that he would not have
dissented had there been convincing evidence that the 1983 "Rule 11
regime [was] ineffective, or encourage[d] excessive satellite litigation."47
Justice Scalia relies upon the judicial responses to the FJC survey for the
idea that the federal bench generally agrees that the current 1983 version
of Rule 11 essentially works. 48 The responses suggest that trial judges,
who face litigation abuse daily, overwhelmingly favor the 1983 provision
and these responses persuade Justice Scalia that the Court should not gut
the rule through the proposed amendment. 49
However, Justice Scalia does not mention that the relative inability of
the 1983 Rule 11 to prevent frivolous litigation and the rule's promotion
of satellite litigation were apparently two important reasons for the Advisory Committee's proposed revision. 50 Justice Scalia rather selectively

40. See Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 50713 (explaining why Justice Scalia dissented from the transmittal of the amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
41. Id. at 507.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 507-08.
44. Id. at 508.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 508-09.
47. Id. at 509.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 509-10.
50. See Letter from Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr.. Chairman, Advisory Committee, to Judge Robert
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invokes the survey results by not mentioning the survey replies whic.h
showed that eighty percent of the federal district bench thinks that groundless litigation is a minor problem.s 1 Justice Scalia correspondingly neglected to mention that a majority of federal judges find numerous procedures other than Rule 11 more effective in thwarting groundless lawsuits.s2 Moreover, if the trial bench favored the 1983 Rule as much as
Justice Scalia suggests,s3 the bench could well have insured the 1983
version's retention because every entity in the rule revision hierarchy
respects and defers to those federal judges' perspectives on civil rules
modification.54 In any event, the rule revision entities, whose membership
consists primarily of federal judges, seemingly concluded that a stricter
amendment's potential disadvantages, such as satellite litigation and chilling effects, outweighed its benefits, namely deterrence of frivolous cases.ss
Indeed, the federal judiciary's support for changing Rule 11 would
apparently suffice for Representative William J. Hughes (D.-N.J.), who
chairs the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and
Judicial Administration.s6 This subcommittee has the responsibility for
overseeing revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.57 Even
though Hughes harbors reservations about certain aspects of the amendment, the subcommittee chair will probably defer to the federal bench
because he finds broad support for the revision and for curtailing "the

E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee, Attach. B (May l, 1992), reprinted in AMENDMENTS,
supra note 2, at 523-24; Tobias, supra note 34, at 174, 177 & n.49, 178 n.51, 179 & n.62. See generally supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of groundless litigation in the Rule
11 amendment process).
51. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
53. Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 509-10
("But the overwhelming approval of the Rule by the federal district judges who daily grapple with the
problem of litigation abuse is enough to persuade me that it should not be gutted as the proposed
revision suggests.").
54. See S. 2212, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (bill requiring that rule revision committees "have
a majority of members of the practicing bar"); Laura A. Kaster & Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Rulemakers
Should Be Litigators, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 17, 1992, at 15, 16, available in WESTLAW, NLJ Database
(suggesting that fewer judges and more litigators serve as rulemakers because judges control the rule
revision process); John P. Frank, Rule 11-The Need to Start Over 15 (May 1, 1992) (same) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Florida Law Review). These entities are the Advisory Committee,
the Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court. Id. at 14-15.
55. See Tobias, supra note 34, at 178 & n.53.
56. A Laok at the New Committee Lineups in the 103d Congress, THE THIRD BRANCH, Feb.
1993, at 6. Senator Howell T. Heflin (D.-Ala.) chairs the Senate analogue, the Subcommittee on
Courts and Administrative Practice. Id.
57. Federal Courts: Bill to Delete Discovery Rule Reported to House Committee, Daily Rep. for
Executives (Regulation, Economics and Law) (BNA), Aug. 6, 1993, available in WESTLAW, BNADER Database.
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explosion of satellite litigation" which the 1983 version of Rule 11 has
fostered. 58 Other members of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate, however, have evinced less deference to the federal bench. The
members' lack of deference is manifested by their introduction of several
bills that would postpone the amendment's effective date for a year. 59
Congress will experience considerable difficulty attempting to improve
on many components of the amended Rule 11. The modifications represent the well-considered judgment of the rule revision entities and their
expert advisors. 60 The amendment concomitantly constitutes the most
efficacious means of addressing the broad range of factual situations
which Rule 11 implicates. For instance, the amended Rule 11 employs
terms such as "reasonable" and "likely."61 These terms are the clearest
and fairest terminology for treating the inherently fact-specific issues that
motions to sanction raise. 62
Congress also will encounter problems attempting to enhance even
those remaining aspects of the rule revision which could be improved. For
example, two potentially troublesome components are the Advisory
Committee's use of the adjective "nonfrivolous" to describe acceptable
legal arguments 63 and the Committee's use of the words "appropriate
sanctions" to delineate the assessments that courts may award. 64 Use of
these terms will foster inconsistent application and satellite litigation. 65
Retaining the 1983 Rule's phrase, "good faith," rather than substituting
"nonfrivolous," and additionally circumscribing judicial discretion to sanction, would remedy or ameliorate these complications. 66 Nonetheless,
Congress will encounter the greatest resistance to modifying these changes
because they represent the very areas on which compromises were struck,
consensus solidified, or political interests reached equilibrium. 67
In short, Congress will realize little advantage by suspending the effective date of amended Rule 11 for an additional year. Indeed, mounting
political pressure, to which Congress has few responses, will only intensify. 68 Therefore, Congress may prefer not to delay the inevitable, but to
58. See id.
59. See S. 1382, 103d Cong., !st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2979. 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
61. See FED. R. Clv. P. 1 l(a)-(b).
62. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 1791. See generally Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983) (suggesting the difficulty of writing and applying precise
rules).
63. See FED. R. Clv. P. I l(b)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. (1988); Tobias, supra note
6, at 1781; Tobias, supra note 34, at 196-201.
64. See FED. R. Clv. P. I l(c); Tobias, supra note 34, at 209-14.
65. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 29-38, 56-59.
68. See S. 1382, 103d Cong., !st Sess. (1993) (calling for the enactment of a new Rule 11); H.R.
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bite the political bullet now. Of course, 1994 is an election year.
The truth regarding many of the above propositions relating to Rule
11 may well lie somewhere in the middle. 69 For instance, the rule revisors substantially reduced the incentives for invoking Rule 11 by prescribing safe harbors from sanctions,70 by permitting judges to exercise discretion in deciding whether to sanction, and by granting judicial discretion to
decide what type of sanction to impose when judges find Rule 11 violations.71 The Advisory Committee concomitantly omitted several onerous
requirements from the preliminary proposed Rule 11 draft, such as the
continuing duty which would have demanded that lawyers and parties
meticulously track small fragments of papers throughout litigation and that
they withdraw those papers when the papers became untenable.72 The revisors decreased incentives for using Rule 11 and the Advisory Committee
deleted these burdensome strictures despite the lingering concerns about
deterring groundless lawsuits which Justice Scalia so forcefully expresses.13
Nevertheless, the rule revisors simultaneously employed terminology,
such as "nonfrivolous" and "appropriate sanctions,"74 which will inexorably engender inconsistent application and satellite litigation.75 The revisors correspondingly retained certain incentives for seeking sanctions.76
For example, the amended Rule authorizes judges to award parties who
pursue Rule 11 motions the costs of prevailing and to levy sanctions of
attorneys' fees in certain situations.77
In the final analysis, the 1993 Rule may not be perfect, but the 1993
revision substantially improves the 1983 version,78 and is much clearer
and fairer than the Advisory Committee's preliminary draft.79 Moreover,
the 1993 Rule is considerably better than could be expected given the
significant restraints imposed upon the rule revision entities. These restraints include the need to accommodate the various interests, such as the

2979, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (same).
69. Compare supra text accompanying notes 32-38 (discussing the Advisory Committee's view)
with supra text accompanying notes 39-49 (discussing Justice Scalia's view).
70. See FED. R. CIV. P. ll(c); Tobias, supra note 6, at 1784-85.
71. See FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c); Tobias, supra note 6, at 1783-88.
72. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 866-71; Tobias, supra note 34, at 192-96; supra
text accompanying note 24.
73. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
74. FED. R. CIV. P. ll(a)-(b).
75. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
76. Tobias, supra note 6, at 1788.
77. See FED. R. C1v: P. ll(c); Tobias, supra note 6, at 1787-88 (discussing the Advisory
Committee's efforts to reduce some incentives to seek sanctions and leave others intact).
78. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 1776-77.
79. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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federal judiciary and diverse elements of the bar, affected by the amendment. so
Perhaps the most accurate explanation for the revisors' action on Rule
11 is that many federal judges apparently concluded that the 1983 Rule
had achieved as much as it could accomplishs 1 by encouraging counsel
and litigants to perform reasonable prefiling inquiries and by discouraging
the presentation of frivolous papers.s2 The revision entities may have concomitantly determined that Rule 11 's vigorous enforcement was no longer
worth the expenditure of scarce time, money, and energy of courts, lawyers, and parties, for instance, to resolve satellite litigation which the rule
necessitates.s3 Essential as well to the Rule 26 revision was the perception among judges, practitioners, and parties that discovery has now become the bete noire of civil litigation84 and that discovery is in greater
need of reform and holds more promise for real improvement than Rule
11.ss
2. Automatic Disclosure

The process of revising Rule 26 to prescribe automatic disclosures6
was as ironic as the Rule 11 amendment process.s7 The Advisory Committee seemed to forget the recent, unfortunate experience with the 1983
revision of Rule 11. Although the Advisory Committee possessed little
empirical data on the operation of the 1938 version of Rule 11, the Committee changed the provision fundamentally and that 1983 amendment has
become the most controversial revision ever adopted. 88
Notwithstanding extremely limited experimentation with, much less
evaluation of, automatic disclosure, 89 the Advisory Committee published
a 1991 preliminary draft proposal which could have substantially modified

80. See generally CALL FOR COMMENTS, supra note 27 (requesting criticism of Rule 11 from
affected members of the legal community and the public); supra text accompanying note 67 (discussing the balancing of interests in adopting new Rule 11 language).
81. See supra text accompanying note 52.
82. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (stating that the 1993 rule revision is intended to remedy problems stemming from sanctions imposed based on the 1983 amendment while
maintaining high conduct and pleading standards).
83. See Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Ch'il Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139, 142 (1993).
84. See Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Refonn. 27 GA. L.
REV. I. 2-3 (1992) (discussing discovery reform as the focus of judicial reform efforts).
85. See id. at 2; Tobias. supra note 83, at 140.
86. See infra text accompanying note 91 (describing automatic disclosure).
87. See Bell et al.. supra note 84, at 3-4; Tobias, supra note 83, at 141-42. See generally Winter.
supra note 7, at 263, 264-74 (supporting reform and discussing proposed amendment).
88. See Burbank, supra note 14, at 1927-28; supra note 6 and accompanying text.
89. Only three federal districts had experimented with the procedure. Bell et al.. supra note 84, at
17-18; see Mullenix, supra note 5, at 813-21.
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the discovery process.90 That draft would have required plaintiffs and
defendants to disclose before discovery considerable information which
was "likely to bear significantly on any claim or defense."91 Few federal
districts had tested automatic disclosure92 and two of the procedure's early advocates had previously urged that a national rule be adopted only
after widespread experimentation.93 Moreover, passage of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) evidenced Congress' belief that testing
should precede major change.94
No formal proposal in the fifty-five year history of the Federal Rules
has provoked so much vociferous criticism from such a broad spectrum of
practitioners and parties who participate in the civil justice system.95 The
rule revisors received a veritable flood of written opposition during the
six-month comment period and listened to practically universal criticism
during public hearings in Los Angeles and Atlanta.96 At the conclusion of
the Atlanta session, the Advisory Committee responded to this public
input by abandoning the automatic disclosure proposal in apparent deference to numerous districts' experimentation with the procedure under the
CJRA.97 For a short time, therefore, the Advisory Committee seemed to
think that the controversial measure's national imposition was less advisable than selective, local testing of the automatic disclosure concept.98

90. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 10, at 87-99.
91. See id. at 87-88; infra note 102 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
93. See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals
for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1361 (1978) (acknowledging the need for experimentation);
William W Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Disc~very Reform, 50 U. Pm.
L. REV. 703, 723 (1989) (suggesting national prescription of his disclosure proposal only after a successful "trial period"). Both of these articles influenced the Advisory Committee's deliberations. Bell
et al., supra note 84, at 40.
94. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 104-105, 104 Stat. 5089,
5097-98 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. V 1993)) (affording guidance to district
courts in formulating experimental programs and prescribing experimentation with discovery reform).
See generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24
ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1393, 1393, 1402-22 (1992) (discussing the Civil Justice Reform Act and its implementation).
95. Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 512; Bell
et al., supra note 84, at 28-32; Ann Pelham, Forcing Litigants to Share, LEGAL TIMES, May 3, 1993,
at 1.
96. See Bell et al., supra note 84, at 28-32; Tobias, supra note 83, at 141.
97. See Bell et al., supra note 84, at 34-35; Winter, supra note 7, at 268; Randall Sambom, U.S.
CM/ Procedure Revisited, NAT'L LJ., May 4, 1992, at l, available in WESTLAW, NU Database.
Considerable experimentation with automatic disclosure will continue, subject to evaluation by the
Judicial Conference, which will report to Congress on the effort by December 31, 1996. See Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105(c), 104 Stat. 5089, 5098 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 471(Supp.V1993)) (prescribing Dec. 31, 1995 reporting date); Judicial Amendments
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-420, § 4, 108 Stat. 4343, 4345 (1994).
98. See Bell et al., supra note 84, at 34-35; Sambom, supra note 97, at I.
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The Advisory Committee briefly sustained its apparent change of heart
because the Committee reversed course again six weeks later without
additional public comment or explanation. 99 Half of the Advisory Committee convinced the remainder to reconsider, 100 at the instigation of Second Circuit Judge Ralph K. Winter, a persuasive proponent of automatic
disclosure. 101 In the April 1992 Advisory Committee meeting, the Committee members revitalized the automatic disclosure proposal, imposing
the core requirement that litigants disclose "discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings." 102
Justice Scalia suggests that the Advisory Committee apparently found
the CJRA' s experimentation schedule too protracted, "preferring instead to
subject the entire federal judicial system at once to an extreme, costly, and
essentially untested revision of a major component of civil litigation." 103
The Advisory Committee couched in principled terms its decision to modify course twice during a six-week period. Members claimed that discovery
was operating ineffectively, 104 that maintenance of the status quo was
unsatisfactory, 105 and that the legal profession's self-interest prevented it
from instituting constructive change. 106 For instance, Winter perceptively
stated at the April meeting that attorneys will resist discovery reform as
long as they bill by the hour. 107
However, the Advisory Committee seemed to appreciate that the threeyear time frame for amending rules which the new revision process prescribed meant that its failure to require automatic disclosure would essentially postpone judicially-controlled reform of discovery until the late
1990s. 108 Some observers even characterized the reversal as a desperate

99. Bell et al., supra note 84, at 35.
100. Ann Pelham, Panel Flips, OKs Discoioery Reform, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 20, 1992, at 6;
Samborn, supra note 97, at I.
101. See generally Winter, supra note 7, at 274-78 (arguing for discovery reform).
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(l); see Bell et al., supra note 84, at 35-39; PROPOSED AMENDMENTS,
supra note 32, at 517-18 & n.3 (stating that these changes in the revised proposal "do not significantly
expand the extent of change between current rules and the published proposals" and do not require
additional comment). Winter, however, suggests that the revised proposal was intended to be responsive to some critics' "legitimate concerns." Winter, supra note 7, at 269.
103. See Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia, reprillfed in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 512.
104. Bell et al., supra note 84, at 35-39.
105. Pelham, supra note 100, at 6; see Randall Samborn, Derailing the Rules, NAT'L L.J., May 24,
1993, at 1, available in WESTLAW, NLJ Database.
106. Pelham, supra note 95, at 20; Samborn, supra note 105. at I. The last observation illuminates
another irony. Virtually all segments of the organized bar seemed to oppose the disclosure proposal
and to agree that many problems accompany modern discovery. See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 84, at
2-3 (criticizing the present system); Pelham, supra note 95, at 1, 20 (opposing discovery changes).
107. Pelham, supra note JOO, at 6; Samborn. supra note 97, at 12; see also Winter, supra note 7.
at 277 (observing that the interests of attorneys who bill by the hour conflict with the interests of their
clients on the issue of having less discovery).
108. Samborn, supra note 97, at I.
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attempt by the Advisory Committee to preserve the judiciary's flagging
procedural influence, which has been eroded by both congressional reforms and executive branch initiatives. 109
The difficulty of definitively· ascertaining whether any of the automatic
disclosure procedures will prove effective and if so, which, obviously
complicates the debate over automatic disclosure. Very few of the considerable number of districts which have been experimenting with disclosure110 have employed provisions like the one th;it the Court is transmitting.111 Many districts modeled their procedures instead on the Advisory
Committee's preliminary draft automatic disclosure procedure. 112 Even
these district courts have not tested, much less assessed, the automatic discovery mechanism for a period sufficient to yield conclusive determinations regarding its efficacy .113
Anecdotal evidence indicates that a number of Early Implementation
District Courts (EIDCs), and other court~, experimenting with automatic
disclosure have encountered minimal difficulty implementing the measure.114 The procedure apparently operates quite well in some contexts,
particularly when the litigation is relatively simple or the disclosure is
very general. 115 Unfortunately, discovery poses the greatest problems and
requires the most effective reform in complex lawsuits with national ramifications, such as products liability cases, and when litigants need particularized information. 116
Additional anecdotal material suggests that, as practitioners acquire
experience with automatic disclosure, they become less critical of the
concept. 117 In other words, familiarity does not breed contempt. The
principal explanation for this phenomenon seems to be that, while attor-

109. Id.; see Exec. Order No. 12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (Supp. V
1993). See generally Carl Tobias, Executfre Branch CM/ Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1521,
1544-58 (1993) (discussing executive initiatives); Tobias, supra note 94 (discussing congressional
reforms).
110. Tobias, supra note 83, at 144.
111. See supra notes 91, 102 and accompanying text.
112. See Tobias, supra note 83, at 144-45; supra notes 91, 102 and accompanying text.
113. Most of the Early Implementation District Courts (EIDCs) under the CJRA first instituted
automatic disclosure in or after 1992, and few have rigorously evaluated its efficacy. See Tobias, supra
note 83, at 144-45; Samborn, supra note 97, at I.
114. These courts include the Northern District of California and the Districts of Arizona, Massachusetts, and Montana. This evidence is derived from conversations with numerous individuals who
are familiar with civil justice reform in those districts. See also Samborn, supra note 97, at 1; supra
notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
115. See Carl Tobias, More on Federal Civil Justice Refonn in Montana, 54 MONT. L. REV. 357,
363 (1993); supra note 114.
116. See Bell et al., supra note 84, at 39-44; Winter, supra note 7, at 268; supra note 114.
117. See supra note 114. See generally Samborn, supra note 105, at l (providing practitioners'
views, many of them positive, on automatic disclosure).
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neys resist any procedural change, once attorneys attempt to satisfy a
particular stricture imposed they have little difficulty complying. More
specifically, numerous practitioners reportedly find that automatic disclosure simply requires attorneys and their clients to participate in certain
activities, especially document retrieval and labeling, at an earlier juncture
in litigation. 118
Equally respected authorities have declared with similar assurance that
the disclosure proposal transmitted will clearly work, or will certainly
prove inefficacious. Former Judge Griffin B. Bell, who compiled an excellent record of service on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit before President Jimmy Carter appointed him attorney general, has
persuasively argued that the proposal will be ineffective. 119 For example,
Bell contended that the vagueness of the automatic disclosure proposal
would foster greater motion practice and promote overproduction while
increasing expense. 120 Justice Scalia, in dissenting from the Court's transmittal of the revision, subscribes to several of Bell's ideas and articulates
additional convincing propositions. 121 Most importantly, Justice Scalia
suggests that the disclosure amendment "adds a further layer of discovery"122 and "does not fit comfortably within the American judicial system, which relies on adversarial litigation to develop the facts before a
neutral decisionmaker." 123
By contrast, Senior Judge William Schwarzer124 has also argued just
as persuasively that the discovery revision will be efficacious. 125
Schwarzer evaluated and convincingly criticized the five major precepts
which Bell enunciated in support of his contention that the revision is
flawed. 126 For instance, Schwarzer showed that Bell's speculation about
the revision enhancing expense was premised on unfounded notions and
on a "somewhat myopic view of the meaning and operation of the
rule." 127 Winter made an equally strong case for the amendment's effec-

118. See supra note 114.
119. Bell et al., supra note 84, at 4.
120. Id. at 41-46. Others, considerably less eminent than Bell, have agreed. See, e.g.• Tobias. supra note 83. at 142-43.
121. Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2. at 510-12.
122. Id. at 510.
123. Id. at 511.
124. Schwarzer rendered distinguished service as a judge of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California and has been a prolific. frequently-cited writer on civil procedure.
Bell et al., supra note 84, at 17. Schwarzer was also named Director of the Federal Judicial Center on
March 24. 1990. Id.
125. See William W Schwarzer, In Defense of "Awomatic Disclosure in Disco1•ery," 27 GA. L.
REV. 655, 664 (1993).
126. See id. at 656-64.
127. Id. at 663; accord Bell et al., supra note 84, at 44-46.
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tiveness by claiming, for example, that disclosure will combat certain
economic incentives to participate in excessive discovery .128
The Supreme Court transmits the automatic disclosure revision without
change, 129 although three Justices dissent from the transmittal and other
members of the Court express reservations about the transmittal. 130 A
majority of the Justices believe that the amendment is sufficiently workable, the core idea embodied in automatic disclosure is sufficiently worthwhile, and the need to revamp discovery is so important that adoption of
the automatic disclosure revision is warranted. 131 ·
If national application of automatic disclosure troubles Congress, it
could rely on the CJRA, which affords district courts a valuable vehicle
for testing different approaches to disclosure. 132 Congress might refine
experimentation by prescribing testing with several disclosure regimes that
seem most promising in a manageable number of federal districts. 133 In
addition to all of the usual difficulties, such as temporal restraints, which
ordinarily plague congressional efforts to rewrite the transmitted amendments, Congress may currently lack sufficient knowledge about the efficacy of various disclosure measures to select one for nationwide
implementation. 134
Perhaps the consummate irony is that a congressional decision to omit
the provision for automatic disclosure would have little practical effect.
Most of the thirty-four EIDCs have already adopted some type of disclosure procedure135 and a number of the remaining districts have prescribed
the technique, or will provide for automatic disclosure, under the
CJRA.1 36 Therefore, a significant percentage of the ninety-four districts

128. See Winter, supra note 7, at 265-73, 276-77.
129. Compare PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 32, at 606-27 (including amendments as proposed to the Supreme Court) with AMENDMENTS TO TIIE FED. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, reprinted
in 146 F.R.D. 401, 403-04, 431-47 (1993) (including the amendments transmitted to Congress by the
Supreme Court).
130. See Statement of Justice White, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 501; Dissenting
Statement of Justice Scalia, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 507 (joining the dissent in full
is Justice Thomas with Justice Souter joining in part).
131. See Transmittal Letter, supra note 2 (transmitting the amendments to Congress). But see infra
note 146 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Supreme Court's language in the transmittal letter
indicated that the Court approved of the revision in form, but not necessarily in substance).
132. See supra note 94 and accompanying text
133. See Carl Tobias, In Defense of Experimentation with Automatic Disclosure, 27 GA. L. REV.
665, 666-71 (1993).
134. See supra note 114. Seven months is simply insufficient time for a busy Congress to rewrite
complex amendments. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988) "(providing that Congress has seven months to
make changes to the amendments); cf. supra text accompanying notes 59-66 (discussing congressional
efforts to consider Rule 11 ).
135. Tobias, supra note 83, at 144-45.
136. As io the remaining districts, I premise this assertion on personal conversations with numerous individuals involved in civil justice reform in those districts.
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will implement disclosure mechanisms that are inconsistent with the current Federal Rules and with procedures in other districts. 137
These conflicts will complicate participation in federal civil litigation
for attorneys and parties, such as government lawyers and public interest
organizations, which litigate in multiple districts. 138 Such conflicts will
also test judges' and practitioners' tolerance for inconsistency. Indeed, the
CJRA Advisory Group for the Eastern District of New York urged that the
rule revisors observe a "three-year moratorium on affected national rules
so that each district can have a fair opportunity to assess reforms at the
local level." 139 Nonetheless, as courts, counsel, and parties become accustomed to the disclosure concept in specific districts, 140 and as studies
evaluate the procedure's efficacy, the resulting familiarity and documentation will probably indicate that one form of disclosure is superior, thereby
facilitating the promulgation of a uniform, national discovery provision by
the year 2000. 141

Ill. FINAL THOUGHTS
The Court would not presume to offer suggestions regarding rule
revision for several reasons as theoretical as concerns about maintaining
the separation of powers and even about appearing to advise a separate
branch of the federal government. 142 These factors have peculiar applicability today. Indeed, the federal judiciary is acutely sensitive to the delicate, and even deteriorating nature of interbranch relationships, especially
in the important area of court rulemaking, and is carefully cultivating
those relations. 143

137. See Lauren Robel. Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Refonn Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1447, 1452-54 (1994) (analyzing the districts' authority to adopt inconsistent procedures);
Tobias, supra note 83, at 144-45 (same). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional
Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Refonn Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283 (1993)
(analyzing Congress' authority to adopt CJRA).
138. See generally Tobias, supra note 83 (delineating conflict between CJRA reforms and the new
Rule 26).
139. Letter from Edwin J. Wesely, Chair, Advisory Group for the Eastern District of New York. to
Robert Keeton, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States (Feb. 3, 1992) (on file with author); see also Samborn, supra note 105, at I (suggesting
coincidence between CJRA changes and the effective date of new Rule 26). See generally Stephen B.
Burbank. Ignorance and Procedural law Refom1: A Call for a Moratorium. 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841,
842 (1993) (calling for a moratorium on changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
140. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 110-18 (discussing the increased implementation of automatic disclosure in some districts pursuant to the CJRA).
142. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Refonnation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV.
375, 379-82 (1992).
143. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 94, at 1425-26; Don J. DcBenedictis, Tight Budget Squee:es
Courts. 78 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1992, at 22-23 (recounting the relationship between Congress and the ju-
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Additional reasons are as pragmatic as the Justices' decreasingly active
participation in the amendment process, which is consistent with the relative passivity that spans the last three decades. 144 The Court's decision to
transmit all of the revisors' proposals without change is a telling reminder
that the Justices play an extremely circumscribed role in modem rule revision.145 Equally revealing is the cover letter's disclaimer that, "[w]hile
the Court is satisfied that the required procedures have been observed, this
transmittal does not necessarily indicate that the Court itself would have
proposed these amendments in the form submitted." 146 Although the Justices are obviously reluctant to offer anything which might be characterized as advice, 147 they are also cognizant that the present is a critical moment in the history of civil rules revision. This timing compels the Court
to formulate a few significant questions which Congress should address
when considering the package of transmitted amendments and to provide
some final thoughts on the amendments.
Perhaps the crucial queries are how Congress, having opened the
national rule revision process, can maximize the benefits and minimize the
disadvantages of increased public participation in that process 148 while
continuing to capitalize on the finest aspects of a process that has served
the federal courts, Congress, and the public remarkably well during the
last half-century.149 For example, the rule revision entities have accumulated a wealth of expertise, particularly regarding the complexities and
subtleties of federal civil practice, and have applied this expertise to many
difficult civil procedure problems. They have studied developments in
civil litigation, collected, analyzed, and synthesized relevant data, and
drafted proposals for improvements that responded to the needs of all civil
justice system participants. 150 The 1993 revisions represent the handiwork of the Advisory Committee, the Standing Committee, the Judicial

diciary in working out the 1993 judiciary budget). See generally Mullenix, supra note 142, at 379
(discussing the implications of the Civil Justice Reform Act on distribution of procedural rulemaking
power).
144. A quintessential articulation of this is Justice White's separate statement, which accompanied
the package transmitted. See Statement of Justice White, reprillted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2. at
506 (observing that the Court's role has become more limited); Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 374 U.S. 861, 865-70 (1963) (statement of Black, J. and Douglas, J.) (opposing submission of
rules and remarking on the Court's limited role). See generally WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 70-79 (1981) (discussing the extent
and advisability of the Supreme Court's role in promulgating various federal rules).
145. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 2 and accompanying text..
147. See supra text accompanying note 2.
148. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c) (1988); infra notes 146-53, 155 and accompanying text.
149. See Tobias, supra note 94, at 1426.
150. See Tobias, supra note 34, at 176-87 (detailing the work of the rule revision entities).
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Conference, and the Court, 151 all of which focused their expertise on the
important complications of modern procedure and vigorously toiled for
three years to develop the most efficacious amendments.
The 1993 revisions are the fruits of the initial major experiment with
the procedures governing national rule amendment that Congress prescribed in 1988. 152 The new process, which Congress intended to improve rule revision by opening the process to greater public scrutiny,
yielded mixed results. 153 Numerous public comments on the proposed
amendments were of high quality. Considerable public input persuaded the
rule revisors to reexamine significant issues and even to modify a few
proposals, such as those governing Rule 11 and automatic disclosure. 154
Some of the public participation was less constructive, however. A number
of contributions were inaccurate, or were based on minimal empirical data,
while certain submissions were duplicative. 155 This material may have
required that the revisors devote time and energy to ascertaining the relevance of input that ultimately was not useful.
The rule revision entities did not always maximize the benefits and
minimize the disadvantages of public participation by, for instance, using
the cogent comments and ignoring the inaccurate contributions. 156 Moreover, political factors, reflected in certain submissions, might have unduly
influenced the revisors to alter several proposals, namely Rule 11. 157 By
comparison, additional political considerations, and even convincing input,

151. Cf supra note 54 and accompanying text (describing participants in Rule 11 adoption).
152. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2075, 2077 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
153. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(l) (1988) (mandating that the Advisory Committee provide notice of
meetings and that Committee proceedings be open to the public, with limited exceptions).
154. See, e.g., Letter from Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee. to Judge
Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee, Attach. B (May I, 1992), reprinted in
AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 523-24 (indicating that the Advisory Committee changed the Rule 11
draft in response to public input); supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text (indicating that the Advisory Committee changed the automatic disclosure draft in response to public input).
155. These ideas are primarily premised on my review of the written comments of Rule 11 submitted throughout the revision process. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 862-63. The characteristics of public input here resemble those attributed to public participation in administrative agency proceedings. Compare Tobias, supra note 34, at 176-87 (discussing the committee's process of
revising Rule 11, including Call for Comments) with Barry B. Boyer, Funding Public Participation in
Agency Proceedings: The Federal Trade Commission fa:perience, 70 GEO. L.J. 51, 128-29, 139-40
(1981) (evaluating the appearance of, and compensation for, representatives of consumer interests at
FTC rulemaking hearings) and Carl W. Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation: Resofring
the Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Participants in Administrative Proceedings. 82
COLUM. L. REV. 906. 907-09, 945-47 (1982) (discussing generally the problem of encouraging public
input in administrative proceedings and deficiencies associated with compensating participants). This
was predictable, as the new revision process is analogous to notice and comment rulemaking. See 28
U.S.C. § 2073(c) (1988) (providing for public hearings preceded by "sufficient notice").
156. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 28-33, 154 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
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apparently had little effect on the revisors' treatment of other proposals,
particularly automatic disclosure. 158
Increased openness in the process exposed the rule revision entities to
greater political pressure. For example, many attorneys and parties interested in proposed amendments sent numerous overnight packages, including eleventh-hour pleas for revisions in various provisions, to Judge Robert Keeton, the Standing Committee Chair. 159 Supplicants were not bashful about communicating their views to Court members either, although
the Justices lack any formal procedure for reviewing such communications.160
Congress will soon be intensively lobbied by attorneys, litigants, and
additional affected interests who did not secure all that they .wanted in the
rule amendment process. 161 Those participants who failed to persuade the
rule revisors will inevitably bring their case to Congress. If in seven
months, Congress freely modifies proposals which the revisors spent three
years developing, the rule revision process will be undermined and perhaps eviscerated. If Congress substantially changes the Rule 11 and automatic disclosure revisions, the two components of the 1993 package that
are integral to modem civil litigation, Congress could seriously jeopardize
the continued vitality of, and even sound the requiem for, national rule
amendment. Perhaps the supreme irony of the 1988 congressional efforts
to reform rule revision is that the first important test of the new revision
procedures may effectively be the final one.

158. See supra notes 95-102, 154-57 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia similarly considered
much bar input on automatic disclosure as highly persuasive, even as he apparently discounted analogous input on Rule 11. See Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra
note 2, at 512-13; supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Walter Lucas, Bar Blasts Proposed Changes in Discovery, N.J. LJ., Mar. 2, 1992,
at 4 (describing letter from New Jersey Bar President to rules committee); Letter from Arthur H.
Bryant, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, to Judge Robert E. Keeton (June 16, 1992) (on file with the
·
Florida Law Review).
160. See Statement of Justice White, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 505 (observing
that the letters Justice White received indicated the proposals did not please everyone but assuming
that opposing views were properly aired at committee proceedings); Sambom, supra note 105, at 1 (referring to a February 1993 memorandum to the Supreme Court by former Solicitor General Erwin
Griswold).
161. See Mullenix, supra note 5, at 854-55.

